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SINGLE-SEX PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE LAST
BASTION OF "SEPARATE BUT EQUAL"?
In Brown v. Board of Education, Chief Justice Warren stated une-
quivocally that, "[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently un-
equal. '1 The backdrop for Brown was, of course, discrimination by race,
and until recently no court had seriously questioned the constitutionality of
public schools segregated on the basis of sex. 2 However, both the evolving
standard of equal protection 3 as applied to discrimination by sex and the
Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 19744 raise difficult questions as to
the continued validity of single-sex public schools. In this Note, these
constitutional questions will be discussed in light of the standards of equal
protection enunciated since Reed v. Reed. 5 The focus of this analysis will be
on the place, if any, of the doctrine of "separate but equal" in the area of
discrimination by sex. Finally, the applicability and significance of the
Equal Educational Opportunities Act to single-sex public schools will be
examined, with emphasis on its perplexing legislative history.
Historically, single-sex primary and secondary schools have been a
rarity in American public education.6 From their inception, American public
schools were generally open to both sexes. In the smaller settlements, of
course, coeducation was mandated by considerations of economy and con-
venience; but even in the more densely populated eastern cities where
single-sex schools posed no such financial or logistical problems, there was
little demand for segregation by sex, and coeducation was the norm. One
English commentator, in contrasting the American preference for coeduca-
tion with Britain's long history of single-sex schools, theorized that the
mixed school was "the embodiment of the American doctrine of equal
educational opportunities for all." 7 The relatively few single-sex public
THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Gunther].
1. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
2. See, e.g., Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 951
(1971); Allred v. Heaton, 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 517 (1960);
Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230 (1958).
3. See generally Gunther; Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-
1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 617 (1974); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1065 (1969).
4. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (Supp. IV 1974).
5. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
6. B. HOWARD, THE MIXED SCHOOL: A STUDY OF COEDUCATION 41-48 (1928).
7. Id. at 41. Besides the ideological overtones of coeducation, mixed schools were viewed
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schools which have survived to the present generally possess unique attri-
butes, either in the nature of their curriculum or the characteristics of the
student body, which traditionally have been viewed as justification for the
segregation of the school by sex. 8 However, given the diminishing strength
of most sex-role expectations, 9 the continued maintenance of single-sex
public schools can be viewed as a means of reinforcing patterns of discrimi-
nation by sex and raises questions of constitutional magnitude.
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES
Until 1971, the judicial treatment of legal classification by sex10
amounted to little more than total deference to legislative sentiment regard-
ing the proper role of women in society." In seeking out a "rational
relation" between a legislative classification and a legitimate state interest,
the courts hypothesized justifications which often did not even purport to
reflect the actual objective of the classification. 12 The judiciary had essen-
tially abdicated any role in the review of legislative classifications by
gender. 13
as providing a healthier atmosphere for learning. The American system was praised for
achieving "a complete absence of sex-strain" and an "intellectual stimulus due to the intellec-
tual differences between boys and girls." Id. at 43.
8. See Note, Academic High Schools: The Need for Equal Protection for Girls, 8
U.S.F.L. REV. 639, 641-43 (1974).
9. One need only read the newspapers to perceive the general blurring of traditional
sex-role distinctions. In Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), the Supreme Court stated that
this change in the perception of women's roles is a proper subject for judicial consideration. In
striking down a state law making the age of majority higher for men than for women, Justice
Blackmun wrote:
No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family and
only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas. . . . Women's activities
and responsibilities are increasing and expanding . . . . The presence of women in
business, in the professions, in government and, indeed, in all walks of life where
education is a desirable, if not always a necessary, antecedent, is apparent and a
proper subject of judicial notice.
Id. at 14-15.
10. The literature in this area is extensive. The reader is directed to Professor Gunther's
article, as well as to Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975
Sup. CT. REV. I, and Johnston, supra note 3.
11. Three cases provided the analytical framework for sustaining legislative classifications
by sex: Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (sustaining regulation of work hours of women,
based on "Brandeis brief" documentation of the special needs of women); Goesaert v. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding statute prohibiting employment of female bartenders not related
to the bar owner); and Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding law by which women's
names were placed on jury lists only upon special request). It should be noted that Hoyt was
effectively overruled in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975).
12. In Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), Justice Frankfurter wrote, "If [a justifica-
tion for the classification] is entertainable . . . Michigan has not violated its duty to afford
equal protection of its laws. We cannot cross-examine either actually or argumentatively the
mind of Michigan legislators nor question their motives." Id. at 466-67. See also Developments
in the Law, supra note 3, at 1080.
13. The closest analogy to the judicial deference accorded legislative classifications by sex
is in the area of equal protection challenges to economic regulations. See, e.g., Williamson v.
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The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Reed v. Reed, 14 however,
marked the transition to a more stringent standard of review in the area of
sex discrimination. In striking down an Idaho probate code provision under
which men were given mandatory preference over women in the appoint-
ment of administrators and executors, the Court deemed the legislature's
purported concerns for administrative efficiency and the lessening of in-
trafamilial dispute to provide insufficient justification for the classification.
Although the Reed Court neither acknowledged a break with precedent nor
precisely enunciated a more stringent standard of review, it is impossible to
square this result with a rational relation analysis; some have suggested that
the Court's holding is comprehensible only if a suspect classification
method of analysis is assumed. 5 This conclusion is supported by the
Court's perfunctory labeling of the legislative classification as impermiss-
ibly "arbitrary," even though the state offered a justification which was
apparently sufficient to make the choice constitutionally defensible under
even an intermediate standard of review. 16 In short, the Reed Court's close
examination of the facts in discerning the relationship between the classifi-
cation and a permissible state objective heralded an end to the judicial
attitude of total deference in the area of sex discrimination.
Reed's implication that sex is to be treated as a suspect classification
appeared to become an express standard in Frontiero v. Richardson. 17 In
striking down a statute which required female, but not male, Army person-
nel to prove that their spouse was a dependent in order to qualify for special
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220
(1949); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
14. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
15. It is difficult to understand [the] result without an assumption that some special
sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor entered into the analysis. Clear priority
classifications are plainly relevant to the State's interest in reducing administrative
disputes. Even if the requirement be that the means bear a "significant relationship"
to the state's purpose. . . the test would seem to have been met in Reed. Only by
importing some special suspicion of sex-related means from the new equal protection
area can the result be made entirely persuasive.
Gunther 34. See also Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on
Sex, 1975 DuKE L.J. 163, 177-79.
16. Gunther 34. The intermediate standard demands simply that the "legislative means
must substantially further legislative ends." Id. at 20. The actual formulation in Reed is taken
from F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920), which states that a classification
must rest on a "ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation." Id. at 415; see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,76 (1971). The Reed Court acknowledg-
ed that the statutory preference for male executors serves the legitimate state interest of
reducing the workload of probate courts by eliminating a time-consuming issue, i.e., whom to
appoint as executor when both a male and a female file a petition for that position. Id.
Moreover, given the state's premise that most men are more knowledgeable about business
affairs than most women, the classification bears a fairly tight fit to the state objective of
appointing the most qualified person without the need of examining the education and experi-
ence of each petitioner. In short, the classification does substantially serve the legitimate state
goal of expediting one phase of probate without undue detriment to the estate.
17. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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allowances, the Court found the Army's interest in administrative efficiency
insufficiently strong to sustain a classification by sex. IS In a radical depar-
ture from precedent, four Justices joined in declaring that sex would be
treated the same as race and national origin for equal protection purposes. 
19
This bold proclamation of the plurality, however, has never been adopted by
a majority of the Court, and subsequent cases have clearly retreated from the
proposition that sex is a suspect classification.
Two recent cases involving arguably "benign" classifications, Kahn
v. Shevin20 and Schlesinger v. Ballard, 21 revealed a temporary return to the
familiar minimal scrutiny analysis. In Kahn, the Court upheld a Florida
statute giving widows, but not widowers, a $500 property tax exemption.
Positing that "[tihere can be no dispute that the financial difficulties con-
fronting the lone woman in Florida or in any other State exceed those facing
a man,'"22 the Court concluded that the statute was "reasonably designed to
further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss
upon the sex for whom that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy bur-
den." 23 In Ballard, Navy tenure standards giving women more time than
men to achieve required promotions were upheld on the ground that "Con-
gress may . . . rationally have believed that women line officers had less
opportunity for promotion than did their male counterparts. ... 24 One
commentator has suggested that this use of minimal scrutiny language in
Kahn and Ballard indicates that "ameliorative" sex-based classifications
will be subject to the least stringent of equal protection standards, while
classifications disadvantageous to women will be subject to strict scrutiny. 25
This best-of-all-worlds proposition has been properly criticized 26 in light of
Geduldig v. Aiello, 27 in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of
18. Id. at 690-91.
19. Id. at 688. Mr. Justice Powell decried this plurality position as both an unnecessary
extension of Reed and an unwarranted assumption of "decisional responsibility" at a time
when the same question was before the state legislatures in the form of the Equal Rights
Amendment. Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
20. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
21. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
22. 416 U.S. at 353.
23. Id. at 355. Justice Douglas sidestepped the fact that the classification was terribly
overbroad, in that the tax exemption was given to women regardless of need. The state could
have made the exemption conditional on the taxpayer's income, but chose not to for reasons of
administrative convenience. Justice Douglas attempted to distinguish Frontiero, which stated
that administrative convenience was not enough by itself to justify a classification by sex, by
noting that the state should be given greater leeway in the exercise of its taxing power. Id. This
is a dubious distinction.
24. 419 U.S. at 508.
25. Note, supra note 15, at 164.
26. Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 8. This is not to say, however, that the outcomes of Kahn
and Ballard were not significantly affected by the Court's perceptions that these gender-based
classifications were socially desirable. See Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451, 457 n.6 (1976).
27. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). See also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976)
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California's disability income program which excluded disability related to
normal pregnancy. Although the benign quality of a classification may
indicate that the state harbors no invidious motives, this distinction does
not appear to be a sufficient basis for an enduring equal protection standard
in the area of sex discrimination.
28
The most recent case in the area of sex-based classifications, Craig v.
Boren,29 is important in several respects. First, it confirms the existence of
an intermediate standard of review; second, it apparently makes this stand-
ard applicable even when the classification has a benign effect on females;
and third, it sets out a new formulation of the intermediate standard. Since
the members of the Court wrote seven opinions in the 7-2 decision, it is clear
that Craig will not be the last word in this area; however, its implications
must be closely examined.
(upholding, in face of Title VII challenge, exclusion of normal pregnancy from comprehensive
sickness and accident benefit plan given all employees).
Although both Geduldig and Gilbert arguably involve a gender-neutral exclusion of one
type of health disability, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20, such reasoning is problematic. See General Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 404, 416 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Employers are obviously
reasonable in seeking to avoid the high costs of including recurring conditions like pregnancy in
their benefit plans; but, to be genuinely gender-neutral, the exclusion would have to encom-
pass all disorders and abnormal conditions of the human reproductive system. The GE plan,
however, insured against such risks as prostatectomies, vasectomies and circumcisions. Id. The
inclusion of the latter two maladies also makes questionable the majority's attempt to distin-
guish pregnancy from other health-related disabilities by insisting that it is a wholly "volun-
tary" condition. Id. at 415-16.
28. In a recent case involving "benign discrimination," the Court invalidated a Social
Security Act provision requiring widowers, but not widows, to prove actual dependency on the
deceased spouse in order to qualify for survivor's benefits. Califano v. Goldfarb, 97 S. Ct. 1021
(1977). The Secretary argued that the statistically small incidence of men being dependent on
their wives for financial support gave Congress reasonable grounds for the gender-based
distinction. Citing Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976), for the proposition that a gender-based
discrimination against men will fail unless it serves an important governmental objective and is
substantially related to the achievement of that objective, Justice Brennan struck down the
provision as being based on nothing more than archaic and overbroad generalizations. 97 S. Ct.
at 1032. Justice Stevens concurred on the ground that, when Congress used the term "widow,"
it really meant "surviving spouse." Id. at 1035.
In a significant dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that administrative
convenience will not generally sustain a classification by gender (citing Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)), but insisted that such a basis is adequate in "social welfare" cases. 97
S. Ct. at 1041. In devising an equal protection standard that turns on whether the interest at
stake is a creature of social welfare legislation, Justice Rehnquist appears to reflect the Court's
renewed tendency in procedural due process cases to balance the public interest against private
interests. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Regardless of the merits of
this development in the due process area, it appears to be singularly inappropriate to equal
protection analysis.
Despite Goldfarb, it appears that the concept of benign discrimination still has some utility.
See Califano v. Webster, 97 S. Ct. 1192 (1977) (per curiam reversal of district
court decision which had struck down gender-based difference in the calculation of Social
Security benefits).
29. 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
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In striking down Oklahoma's sex-based age differential for the legal
consumption of beer, Justice Brennan stated that a legislative classification
by sex must be founded on more than a "weak congruence" between sex
and the characteristic or trait that sex purports to represent. 30 The trait that
sex purported to represent here-a propensity to drive while drunk-was
viewed as bearing too tenuous a "fit" to the classification by sex, 31 despite
evidence showing that more than eighteen times as many 18-to-20-year-old
males as females were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.32
Justice Brennan insisted that "[W]hile such a disparity is not trivial in a
statistical sense, it can hardly form the basis for employment of a gender line
as a classifying device." 33
After reviewing the decisions since Reed, the majority devised a
formulation of the intermediate standard of review: "To withstand constitu-
tional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives." 34 The Oklahoma statute fell on the
"substantially related" requirement. Justice Brennan, after dismissing the
state's data showing higher rates of arrests and accidents for 18-to-20-year-
old males than females, noted that the surveys failed to measure both the
dangerousness of 3.2 beer (as opposed to alcohol generally) and the propen-
sity for drunken driving as functions of age. 35 Given these deficiencies in the
"fit" between the classification and the trait, the statute "invidiously
discriminated" against males eighteen to twenty years of age. 36
30. Id. at 458.
31. Id. at459.
32. Id. at 458 n.8.
33. Id. at 459.
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 459-60 & n.14.
36. In perhaps the most significant of the concurrences, Justice Stevens appeared to reject
entirely the "tier" approach to equal protection analysis:
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every state to govern impar-
tially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and
a different standard in other cases . . . . I am inclined to believe that what has
become known as the two-tiered analysis of equal protection claims does not describe
a completely logical method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has
employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably
consistent fashion.
Id. at 464. Although he provided only the broad outline of his analysis, Justice Stevens seems to
suggest a two-step approach. He first asked if the classification was "objectionable," id. at
465, a term which he did not define. It appears, however, to be synonomous with "obnoxious"
and "offensive." See id. at 464-65. If the classification is objectionable, the court must then
inquire whether the state can put forward a justification "sufficient to make an otherwise
offensive classification acceptable." Id. at 465. Justice Stevens found the Oklahoma statute in
Craig objectionable because it turned on an accident of birth, because it reflected socially
outmoded biases, and because it actually restricted the wrong sex in terms of physical ability to
tolerate alcohol from drinking beer. Id. Although he conceded that the classification was not
"totally irrational," Justice Stevens found no logical justification sufficient to make the
offensive classification acceptable. Id.
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In light of Craig, it now can be confidently 'stated that the proper
standard of review in sex discrimination cases is something intermediate
between a rational relation analysis and a strict scrutiny test. However,
uncertainty remains as to how courts will apply Justice Brennan's formula-
tion calling for an "important" governmental interest and a "substantial"
relation of the classification to the state's objectives. Since most lower
courts already apply some type of heightened scrutiny to gender-based
classifications,37 it is unlikely that the results in a significant number of
Justice Stevens' apparent rejection of the tier model of equal protection, coupled with his
adoption of a flexible standard of equal protection, has important implications. See Yarbrough,
The Burger Court and Unspecified Rights: On Protecting Fundamental And Not-So-
Fundamental "Rights" or "Interests" Through a Flexible Conception of Equal Protection, 1977
DUKE L.J. 143, 162 n. 111 and accompanying text. Under a unified approach, suspect classifica-
tion analysis could be limited to race, which is the only classification to which the equal protec-
tion clause was originally addressed. Id. Other suspect and semi-suspect classifications would
be subjected to a balancing-of-interests analysis of the type described by Justice Stevens. Al-
though a flexible standard would be conceptually less precise than the present tier approach, it
has the advantage of forcing courts to articulate those bases for their decisions which currently
lie submerged beneath the conclusory labels of suspect classification, rational relation and
compelling interest. Labeling a classification as suspect is little more than an obtuse shorthand
for Justice Stevens' inquiry into whether a state can offer sufficient justification to make an
otherwise offensive classification acceptable. The advantages of this above-the-table interest-
balancing approach are even more apparent with regard to the fundamental rights branch of
equal protection analysis. See id.
The Craig dissenters rejected the majority's use of an intermediate standard of review.
Chief Justice Burger rejected such a standard as applied in any sex discrimination case, 97 S.
Ct. at 466-67, while Justice Rehnquist expressed alarm at its application to invalidate a statutory
discrimination harmful to males. Id. at 468-69. Citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Chief Justice demanded that there be a "textually in-
dependent constitutional status" in order to afford gender any preference for equal protection
purposes. Id. at 467. This analysis, however, would appear to confuse fundamental rights with
suspect classifications.
37. The lower courts were not without their problems in discerning and applying the equal
protection standards enunciated in Reed and such subsequent cases as Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7 (1975) (striking down as "irrational" Utah law making age of majority higher for males
than females), and Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (striking down social security
provision granting benefits to wife, but not husband, of a deceased wage earner with minor
children). As a caveat to his analysis of the area, one district court judge noted that, "A lower
court faced with this line of cases has an uncomfortable feeling, somewhat similar to a man
playing a shell game who is not absolutely sure there is a pea." Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of
Philadelphia, 400 F. Supp. 326, 340-41 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (discussed at notes 41-44 infra and
accompanying text). If any generalization can be made about the behavior of the lower courts in
the area of sex discrimination, it is that their actions accorded almost exactly with those of the
Supreme Court prior to Craig, i.e., they employed the language of minimal scrutiny while
generally applying (either expressly or sub rosa) some variation of the intensified, means-
focused standard of review described by Professor Gunther, see Gunther 36. See, e.g., Craw-
ford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114, 1123 (2d Cir. 1976) (striking down as "irrational" a Marine
Corps regulation mandating the discharge of pregnant Marines); White v. Fleming, 522 F.2d
730, 733-36 (7th Cir. 1975) (striking down ordinance prohibiting female tavern employees from
sitting with male patrons); Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 348 (Ist Cir.
1975) (striking down league regulation prohibiting girls from playing on team); Berkelman v.
San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 1974) (striking down admis-
sions policy allowing admission of boys less qualified than some girls denied admission);
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future cases will turn solely on the difference, if any, between the Brennan
formulation and the formulations previously employed in most circuits.
Nonetheless, Craig is significant insofar as it clears the air of doubts
regarding the continued application of the minimal scrutiny standard to
certain types of sex-based classifications. Clearly, the Craig formulation
allows little room for judicial deference to legislative classifications by sex;
future classifications face a standard of review applied with a "new bite. 38
THE STANDARD APPLIED: THE Vorchheimer DILEMMA
In Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia, 39 the question of
the constitutionality of single-sex public schools was presented in a context
ideally suited for a resolution of lingering questions about segregation by
gender40 Susan Vorchheimer, a bright teen-age girl,4 ' was denied admis-
sion to Central High School (one of Philadelphia's two "academic schools"
which admit only intellectually superior students) on the basis of sex.
Vorchheimer subsequently filed a class action in federal district court under
both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment 42 on
Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 230-31 (4th Cir. 1973) (striking down state senate resolution
permitting females to serve as clerical assistants but not as pages). However, a few circuits
have clung to the "original understanding" of the rational relation test, and require only the
weakest of justifications to sustain a classification by sex. See, e.g., Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d
492, 496 (6th Cir. 1975) (sustaining a height requirement for police personnel as rational on the
ground that most municipalities still utilize such a requirement); Robinson v. Board of Regents,
475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973) (upholding university curfew rules applicable to women only).
Contra, Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973) (invalidating high
school regulation prohibiting girls from participating with boys in interscholastic athletic con-
tests). These decisions appear to be inconsistent with the tenor of most thinking on the subject
and with the Supreme Court's view. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 3, at 688-92.
38. Gunther 36.
39. 400 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct.
252 (1976). As this Note went to press, the Supreme Court handed down a decision in
Vorchheimer. 45 U.S.L.W. 4350 (U.S. April 20, 1977). By an evenly divided vote (Justice
Rehnquist not participating), the Court affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit. No opinions
accompanied the announcement of the decision.
40. Williams v. McNair, 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 951 (1971),
presented a superficially similar, but easily distinguishable, problem. There a male was denied
admission to Winthrop College, an all-female state school. In upholding the school's admissions
policy, the district court noted that all other South Carolina state colleges, with the exception of
the Citadel, were coeducational, and offered as good an education as Winthrop. Williams
seems of little precedential value, since Philadelphia offered Vorchheimer but one school, Girls
High, which was suitable to her abilities, and that school was clearly inferior to the all-boys
school in its science facilities and arguably inferior in other ways. See 400 F. Supp. at 328. See
notes 52-63 infra and accompanying text.
41. The plaintiff's academic junior high school awarded her the school prizes in geometry,
science, history and English; she also received the American Legion award for citizenship and
the most outstanding student award. 400 F. Supp. at 328.
42. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28. The district court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
this state law claim, since the amendment had yet to be the subject of litigation at the state court
level.
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behalf of all qualified females who had been or would be denied admission
to Central on the basis of sex. In response to Vorchheimer's claim of
unlawful discrimination, the Philadelphia school district proffered two pur-
portedly empirical studies supporting segregation by sex in schools. 43 Neith-
er study, however, dealt precisely with the issue before the court.
Applying an intermediate standard of review," the district court ex-
pressed great difficulty in accepting these tenuously relevant studies as
evidence that segregation by sex bore a fair and substantial relation to the
city's generalized interest in educating its children and producing good
citizens. The court found it hard to believe that anything more than tradition
was sustaining the sex segregation of Girls High School and Central in view
of the fact that nearly the entire school system was coeducational. Based on
these considerations, an order was issued enjoining the school board from
refusing to admit Vorchheimer and members of her class to Central on the
basis of sex.
Writing for the Third Circuit, Judge Weis reversed.45 In a perplexing
opinion, the court avoided saying whether it ought to apply minimal scrutiny
or some intermediate standard of review by declaring that it made no
difference on the facts before it.' The need to allow "innovation in methods
and techniques" was found to be adequate justification for segregation by
sex, despite the fact that the weight of educational theory (the defendant's
"empirical" evidence notwithstanding)47 gave little support for such techni-
ques.4
43. The Tidball Study showed that, from 1910 to 1950, Who's Who of American Women
contained two to three times as many graduates of women's colleges as from coed schools. The
problems with the Tidball methodology seem obvious. First, the comparison of absolute
numbers is meaningless; a significant comparison would be weighted according to the numbers
of women who had attended the two types of colleges. Further, because there could be no
effective control for the woman's social standing and economic status (both of which are
related to the probability of having one's name in Who's Who), any conclusion that single-sex
education contributed to personal achievement as reflected by inclusion in Who's Who is little
more than speculation. It has also been noted that:
A 1910's to 1950's Who's Who search would turn up not a single woman achiever
from the nation's most prestigious, richly endowed colleges. For the gates of, e.g.,
Princeton, Yale, Harvard, Dartmouth, Brown, Amherst, like Central's door today,
were then shut to women.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19 n. 11, Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 97 S. Ct.
252 (1974). The second study examined selected attitudes (but not achievements) of average
students in New Zealand's comprehensive schools. The researcher conceded that the study was
largely uninstructive as to the relative merits of single-sex schools for academically gifted
American students. 400 F. Supp. at 330-32.
44. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
45. 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976).
46. Id. at 888.
47. See note 43 supra.
48. The most comprehensive empirical study of the merits of coeducation is R. DALE,
MIXED OR SINGLE-SEX SCHOOL? (1969). This three-volume work examines three areas: pupil-
teacher relationships, attainment of societal objectives, and student achievement. Although the
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Even if its deference to the school district was warranted and its
understanding of the Reed series of cases was correct, the Third Circuit's
opinion is disturbing because of dicta which suggest that an alternative basis
for the finding of no denial of equal protection was that "separate but
equal" facilities were available. In a significant section of the opinion, the
court distinguished Reed, Frontiero and Stanton by noting that
[i]n each instance where a statute was struck down, the rights of the
respective sexes conflicted, and those of the female were found to
be inadequate. None of the cases was concerned with a situation
in which equal opportunity was extended to each sex or in which
the restriction applied to both . . . . The plaintiff [here] has
difficulty in establishing discrimination in the school board's policy. 49
It is difficult to avoid concluding that the Vorchheimer court believed the
city's policy of sex segregation in its "academic" schools to be based on a
theory of equal benefit and, therefore, simply not to be a denial of equal
protection. 50 The acceptance of such a theory, however, ignores several
relevant considerations in the area of discrimination by sex.
A LINGERING DOUBT: CAN ALL-GIRL SCHOOLS BE SEPARATE
BUT EQUAL TO ALL-Boy SCHOOLS?
The problem with the Vorchheimer majority's theory of equal benefit
is analogous to the problem with Plessy v. Ferguson's5' concept of "sepa-
rate but equal." Each involves a failure to perceive that when two groups of
presently unequal status are segregated solely on the basis of that status,
separate rarely can be equal. Even before Brown, the Court had recognized
that, in the area of education, the mere equivalency of designated tangibles
(e.g., number of faculty, size of library, quality of buildings) does not
necessarily provide an equality of educational opportunity. 52 Such intang-
ibles as tradition, standing in the community, position and influence of the
studies do not uniformly reveal advantages in coeducation, the author's conclusion is that the
advantages strongly outweigh the disadvantages. See 3 id. at 229-74.
49. 532 F.2d at 886 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 887. The majority actually ascribed to the plaintiff herself a concession that the
schools were in fact equal. The court stated:
A fair summary of the parties' positions, therefore, is that:
4. the deprivation asserted is that of the opportunity to attend a specific school, not
that of an opportunity to obtain an education at a school with comparable
academic facilities, faculty and prestige.
Ido at 882. Judge Weis' misunderstanding of the facts is reflected in his formulation of the
question before the court: "Do the Constitution and laws of the United States require that
every public school, in every public school system in the Nation, be coeducational?" Id. at 881.
51. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In his dissent, Judge Gibbons summarized the majority opinion by
paraphrasing Plessy. 532 F.2d at 889.
52. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632-36 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
339 U.S. 637, 641-42 (1950); see Missouri exrel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 350-52 (1938).
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alumni, and prestige are certainly as important in the determination of
equality in the area of education. A further consideration in examining
sex-segregated schools is the relative deprivation entailed in not being able
to make friends and acquire "contacts" among the group (the males at
Central) who probably will continue to dominate the business and
professional life of the community. A final factor, perhaps one of less
constitutional significance than the others, is the possibility that the same
psychological damage ("feeling of inferiority") discussed in Brown53
might occur among girls denied access to the facilities provided to boys. 54
Each of these factors must be considered in determining whether educational
facilities segregated on the basis of sex are inherently unequal.
A. The Intangibles: Position and Prestige
In Sweatt v. Painter55 the Court recognized that equality of educational
opportunity requires more than an equivalence of faculty and facilities.
Striking down a state's attempt to maintain a separate, all-black law school,
the Court insisted that relevant factors include "those qualities which are
incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law
school. Such qualities. . . include reputation of the faculty, experience of
the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the
community, traditions and prestige.'"56
Although these considerations are less striking in the case of high
schools, they are relevant, especially in the context of distinguished
academic schools which have unique traditions and a definite standing in the
53. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
54. The relevance of sociological and psychological data to constitutional decision-making
has been a more controversial question than it should be, largely because of a misunderstanding
of the uses of such data. For an overview of the controversy, see Gregor, The Law, Social
Science, and Social Segregation: An Assessment, 14 W. RES. L. REV. 621 (1963); Lewis, Parry
and Risposte to Gregor's The Law, Social Science, and School Segregation: An Assessment, id.
at 637; Gregor, The Law and Social Science: A Reply to Lewis, 15 W. RES. L. REV. 111 (1963).
While few would care to build a constitutional doctrine on the shifting sands of social science,
certain findings of fact in cases of discrimination necessarily require the application of princi-
ples which are far less certain than the laws of physics. For example, it is impossible to prove in
a mathematical sense that any environmental factor (e.g., racial discrimination) ever causes a
behavioral disorder (e.g., feelings of inferiority). However, there is a general consensus that the
foregoing inference of causation is more than mere speculation, and probably rises to the same
level of certainty as other legal determinations, e.g., sanity in the context of criminal cases or
proximate cause in the tort area. Granted, social science theories do change, and such changes
may jeopardize constitutional decisions which include findings based on an earlier theory.
However, social change in general, including change in economic conditions, population and
life styles, are of constitutional significance and have required revisions of doctrine. In short,
social science data, provided it meets current standards of research methodology and com-
mands some consensus, should govern relevant fact determinations until shown to be errone-
ous.
55. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
56. Id. at 634.
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eyes of the community. Because of past domination by males of most social
institutions, Central doubtless outstrips Girls among all the relevant intang-
ibles suggested by Sweatt. 57 Central is the only Philadelphia public school
with a substantial private endowment, and its Barnwell Foundation (estab-
lished by an alumnus) sponsors the visits of distinguished guests. Because of
the achievements of its members, the Central Alumni Association is influen-
tial in Philadelphia affairs. These are among the intangibles that have
characterized Central, and Girls simply cannot claim the same distinction.
By denying girls access to a school with such an unequaled history and
reputation, the city inflicts on them a significant personal and professional
deprivation.
B. Professional Contacts
It is beyond question that one of the primary advantages of attending a
distinguished school is the opportunity to make acquaintances which may be
of social and economic value in later life. For a variety of reasons, Central
arguably offers its students greater opportunities of this nature than does
Girls. At the alumni level, past discrimination fairly guarantees that profes-
sional contacts with the Central alumni are more valuable than contacts with
the Girls alumnae. 58 At the student level, which perhaps is more significant,
the vestiges of sex discrimination will continue to make one's peer group
contacts at Central more valuable in many respects than those available at
Girls. While it is difficult to generalize about something as nebulous as
interpersonal relations, Judge Weis' conclusion that Girls is separate but
equal to Central is clearly open to question on this factor alone.
C. The Psychological Impact of Segregation by Sex
In Brown, Chief Justice Warren wrote that the segregation of black
children "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the communi-
ty that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone." 59 Given the similarities between race and sex discrimination,60 it
57. 400 F. Supp. at 328-29.
58. Although the Girls alumnae count among their ranks three Philadelphia judges and a
past vice president of the American Medical Association, the number of Girls alumnae who
have become influential in business, professional or academic affairs does not approach the
number in that group who have graduated from Central. Id. at 329.
59. 347 U.S. at 494.
60. The incidents of sex discrimination reveal many parallels to racial discrimination. As a
practical matter, both forms of discrimination have resulted in social and professional segrega-
tion, confinement to less prestigious jobs, lower incomes, poorer educations and political
impotence. Under both types of discrimination, the subservient group has been characterized
as being less intelligent, less self-disciplined, less trustworthy and more "instinctual" than the
dominant group. Finally, both types of discrimination are facilitated by the high visibility of
those physical characteristics which identify the group. See Note, "A Little Dearer Than His
Horse:" Legal Stereo-types and the Feminine Personality, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 260,
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is not beyond reason that women continually discriminated against on the
basis of sex will experience some of the same feelings of inferiority.
Although few would contend that the manifestations of sex discrimination
are as crushingly burdensome or as inescapable as the incidents of racial
discrimination, psychological research suggests striking similarities be-
tween women and blacks in the consequences of institutionalized discrimi-
nation. 61
In the Vorchheimer situation, the psychological considerations in-
volved in sex segregation arise in subtle, but nonetheless important, ways.
Specific incidents of sex discrimination cannot be understood outside the
entire pattern of traditional restraints imposed on women, and Susan Vor-
chheimer's different reactions to Central and Girls must be viewed in that
light. Central was founded in 1836 with the immediate intent that it should
be a college-preparatory school for intellectually superior boys. On the other
hand, the original mission of Girls (founded some time later) was to train
public school teachers. Despite the current similarity of the schools in their
avowed purpose to prepare the city's best students for college and profes-
274-75 n. 109 (1971); Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need an Equal
Rights Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1507 (1971).
61. Studies have shown that normal women are more prone than men to feelings of low
self-esteem. Gutmann, Female Ego Styles and Generational Conflict, in FEMININE PERSONALITY
AND CONFLICT 77 (1970). Studies of American children reveal that boys' self-esteem is more
related to internalized standards of achievement while girls depend more on external (and
therefore less controllable) sources of approval and acceptance. Douvan, New Sources of
Conflict in Females at Adolescence and Early Adulthood, in FEMININE PERSONALITY AND
CONFLICT 39 (1970). Another researcher has compared the diagnostic classifications of male
and female psychiatric patients, and has shown that there are characteristically "male" and
"female" types of emotional disturbances. P. CHESLER, WOMEN AND MADNESS 38-49 (1972).
Alcoholism, drug addiction and personality disorders are "male diseases," while women are far
more prone to depression, paranoia and schizophrenia. Id. at 42-43. Chesler attributes these
gender-based differences to nurture, not nature.
Even intellectually superior girls, who could be expected to be less prone to feelings of
inferiority vis-a-vis their male peers, show far less positive attitudes about themselves than do
boys. Smith, Sentence Completion Differences Between Intellectually Superior Boys and Girls,
27 J. PROJECTIVE TECH. AND PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 472 (1963). Other research has shown
that the values learned by young girls actually instill in them a "motive to avoid success." See
generally M. HORNER, SEX DIFFERENCES IN ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION AND PERFORMANCE IN
COMPETITIVE AND NON-COMPETITIVE SITUATIONS (1968). Homer writes, "[Tihe arousal of
motivation to avoid success may very well account for the major part of the withdrawal of so
many trained American women from the mainstream of thought and achievement." Id. at 70.
See also Homer, Fail: Bright Women, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, November, 1969, at 36. Homer's
research methodology, but not her theory, has recently been criticized. See Levine & Crum-
rine, Women and the Fear of Success: A Problem in Replication, 80 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 964
(1975).
By themselves, these studies do not prove that, in all situations, an all-girl school cannot be
equal to an all-boy school. They do, however, give support to the intuitively sound proposition
that single-sex schools have been one of the vehicles for inculcating and reinforcing those
values which have generally led men to positions of power and women to positions of subservi-
ence.
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sional achievement, Girls simply has not kept pace with Central in terms of
the achievements of its graduates. 62
This disparity must ultimately be attributed to general societal discrimi-
nation against women; it is apparent, however, that all-girl schools like
Girls High have played a role in cultivating the attitudes and behavior of
women that have kept the great majority from achieving professional promi-
nence and positions of power, regardless of ability. In other words, the
touted educational equivalency of Girls and Central is meaningless unless
the students of both schools are inculcated with the same career objectives
and attitudes toward professional achievement. In a society in which many
still insist there is a vast chasm between the proper roles of men and women,
the only way that it can be assured that intellectually superior girls like
Susan Vorchheimer will be exposed to the career perspectives and personal
values instilled in the boys at Central is to allow them admission to that
school. These possible differences between Girls and Central in the presen-
tation and inculcation of values may be the undefined type of harm 63 that
Vorchheimer feared and which prompted her to attend a coeducational
comprehensive school rather than an all-girl academic school. While this
difference between Girls and Central may not, by itself, be of constitutional
significance, it does make a theory of equal benefit (i.e., separate but equal)
less tenable.
In summary, it must be noted that the current uncertainty about the
practical application of the intermediate standard of review in the area of sex
discrimination makes it impossible to state with confidence that separate but
equal single-sex schools deny equal protection to girls. The problem in
Vorchheimer, of course, is that Girls High is separate from, but not equal
to, Central. The Philadelphia school district offered meager quasi-scientific
data which suggest certain general benefits stemming from segregating
children by sex, but presented no evidence that the achievement of Philadel-
phia's academically gifted students is higher in sex-segregated schools than
in coeducational schools. Absent a showing that at least some educational
interest of the school system is advanced by sex segregation, the classifica-
tion should fall under even the most deferential equal protection review. The
maintenance of an overwhelmingly coeducational system appears to negate
the existence of a substantial city interest in segregating by sex-the dis-
crimination is not backed by an "important" governmental objective. 64
Since Philadelphia does not offer a coeducational alternative to academical-
ly gifted girls, the refusal to admit girls to the city's finest school must be
seen as an impermissible denial of equal protection.
62. 400 F. Supp. at 329.
63. Id. at 328.
64. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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THE EEOA: SEX AS A PROHIBITED CLASSIFICATORY BASIS
The Equal Educational Opportunities Act65 became law in 1974 in
essentially the same form as the unsuccessful 1972 bill of the same name 66
proposed as part of President Nixon's "Busing Moratorium.' '67 The unam-
biguous objective of the legislation was to curtail the use of busing to
achieve racial balances in public schools. The significance of the Act to the
problem of single-sex public schools lies in the fact that sex is generally
included with race, color and national origin as a prohibited basis for the
maintenance of dual school systems. If applicable, the EEOA should be
dispositive of the Vorchheimer question.68
65. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (Supp. IV 1974). The Act provides in part:
Sec. 1701(a). The Congress declares jt to be the policy of the United States that-
(1) all children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal educational opportun-
ity without regard to. . . sex ....
See. 1702(a). The Congress finds that-
(1) the maintenance of dual school systems in which students are assigned to
schools solely on the basis of . . . sex . . . denies to those students the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment ....
Sec. 1703. No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on
account of his or her . . . sex . . . . by- (c) the assignment by an educational
agency of a student to a school, other than the one closest to his or her place of
residence within the school district in which he or she resides, if the assignment
results in a greater degree of segregation of students on the basis of . . . sex...
among the schools of such agency than would result if such student were assigned to
the school closest to his or her place of residence within the school district of such
agency providing the appropriate grade level and type of education for such student
Sec. 1705. [Tlhe assignment by an educational agency of a student to the school
nearest his or her place of residence which provides the appropriate grade level and
type of education for such student is not a denial of equal educational opportunity or
of equal protection of the laws unless such assignment is for the purpose of segregat-
ing students on the basis of . . . sex ....
66. H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The Ninety-second Congress produced
volumes of testimony and debate on this Bill, and the Vorchheimer majority went to great
lengths to ascribe to the Ninety-third Congress, which passed the EEOA, what were perceived
to be the sentiments of the earlier Congress. In 1972, so-called "Title IX" legislation was
enacted which prohibited grants of financial assistance to educational institutions which dis-
criminate on the basis of sex. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. III 1973), as amended, Act of Dec. 31,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-568, § 3(a), 88 Stat. 1862. The coverage of this section included only
institutions of vocational, professional and graduate education, and public institutions of
undergraduate higher education. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (Supp. III 1973). The history of this
provision indicates that one House version would have applied the prohibition to all educational
institutions, including primary and secondary schools. 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972) (remarks of
Sen. Bayh). At the urging of Senator Bayh, the Senate excluded primary and secondary schools
from the Act's coverage. The Vorchheimer majority cited this exclusion from Title IX as
support for the proposition that the absence of references to discrimination by sex in the 1972
version of the EEOA indicated congressional approval of single-sex primary and secondary
schools. Even if this inference has any basis in logic, it seems doubtful that such a sentiment
can be ascribed to a later Congress which expressly added references to discrimination by sex
to the EEOA.
67. See 118 CONG. REC. 8929 (1972).
68. Given that the applicability of the EEOA hinges on whether Congress has declared that
segregation of schools by sex denies equal protection, the constitutional and statutory grounds
for disposition of the case are interrelated. There is no doubt that Congress is authorized under
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Not surprisingly, the records of the debates over the EEOA reveal a
preoccupation with busing to achieve racial balance, and the issue of
single-sex public schools was never raised. 69 The non-obvious applicability
of the EEOA is demonstrated by the fact that in the Vorchheimer litigation,
this legislation was not even mentioned until it was raised sua sponte by the
court of appeals. Unfortunately, the inclusion of sex in the language of the
1974 Act is no more revealing of congressional objectives than was the
exclusion of sex from the language of the unsuccessful 1972 bill.70 If one is
to find support for the proposition that the EEOA forbids single-sex public
schools, it must be found in the language of the statute. Even if it is proper
to give such effect to statutory language when the actual legislative objec-
tives appear to be wholly unrelated, a difficult question remains whether the
language of the EEOA compels the termination of single-sex academic
schools like Central and Girls.
Section 1701 of the EEOA states flatly that the policy of the United
States is that "all children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal
educational opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or national
origin.''71 Of itself, this language does not rule out the segregation of
schools by sex, provided that such schools are equal. However, the EEOA
Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to determine what measures need be taken to enforce
the guarantee of equal protection. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-58 (1966). Assum-
ing that Congress intended the EEOA as a means to remedy the social inequalities stemming
from disparities in educational opportunity, the flat prohibition of single-sex schools would be
appropriate legislation to remove an obstacle to the elimination of state-sponsored discrimina-
tion. See Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudicatioh and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV.L. REv. 91, 120 (1966). This is true despite the fact that
no court has ruled that single-sex schools are violative of equal protection.
It should be noted that Vorchheimer is not a case in which a legal standard applicable
pursuant to a statute would be more stringent than the relevant constitutional standard. Cf.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding a police testing program which had a
racially discriminatory effect, on the ground that constitutional standard in area of racial
discrimination demanded showing of discriminatory intent; Title VII, if applicable, would have
given a different result, since it does not require any showing of intent. Id. at 238-39). In
enacting the EEOA, Congress purported merely to remedy what it perceived to be a denial of
equal protection; it did not enunciate a new standard for the adjudication of cases arising from
discrimination by race, sex or national origin. See notes 71-73 infra and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REc. 8229-85 (1974).
70. In trying to ascribe significance to the inclusion of sex in the language of the 1974 Act,
the Vorchheimer dissent stooped to the same level of obfuscation as the majority did in
attempting to explain the 1972 bill. Judge Gibbons, noting that the successful Esch amendment
used the "race, color, sex, or national origin" formulation, pointed out that the unsuccessful
Anderson amendment had not included sex as a prohibited basis for school assignments. The
defeat of the Anderson amendment was then used to support the proposition that "Congress
expressly added sex to the list of prohibited bases for student assignment and consistently
refused to delete it." 532 F.2d at 893 (emphasis added). Judge Gibbons failed to inform the
reader that the Anderson amendment was rejected not because it deleted the references to sex,
but rather because it tended to emasculate the congressional objective-curtailment of busing.
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. IV 1974).
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includes an express congressional finding that the "maintenance of dual
school systems in which students are assigned to schools solely on the basis
of . . .sex . . denies to those students the equal protection of the laws
... .72 This finding provides a basis for Vorchheimer's assertion that she
was denied equal protection, since Philadelphia indeed operates a dual
"system" of academic schools in which assignments are made exclusively
on the basis of sex. 7
3
When the congressional finding is read in the context of the neighbor-
hood school concept underlying the entire EEOA, it is arguable that Vor-
chheimer's voluntary application to a non-neighborhood school removed her
from the coverage of the Act's assignment provisions.74 This contention,
however, is not supported by other language in the Act which sets forth the
congressional understanding of "neighborhood school." In delineating
guidelines for neighborhood assignment plans, Congress stated that:
[T]he. assignment by an educational agency of a student to the
school nearest his place of residence which provides the appropriate
grade level and type of education for such student is not a
denial of equal protection of the laws unless such assignment is for
the purpose of segregating students on the basis of . . . sex
75
By this language, Philadelphia's academic schools would come under the
coverage of the neighborhood school provisions for purposes of prohibiting
assignments made on the basis of sex, since only these schools provide the
type of education appropriate to the abilities of superior students. The
statute's language and the interrelationship of its provisions therefore support
Judge Gibbons' dissenting view in Vorchheimer that the EEOA is appli-
cable to the single-sex academic schools.
72. Id. § 1702(a)(1).
73. During the extensive hearings on the 1972 bill, the subject of academic schools did not
go unnoticed. In his testimony against the EEOA, Kenneth Young, then Assistant Director of
the AFL-CIO Department of Legislation, engaged in the following exchange with one of the
bill's sponsors, Representative Albert Quie:
Mr. Young: Sure, we like the idea of neighborhood schools when it can be done. But
there are loads of children in this country purposely taken away from neighborhood
schools. There are handicapped children and endowed children. People often ask to
have their children bused beyond the neighborhood. If it can be done for retarded
children and endowed children, then, when you have a denial of the 14th amendment
it can be done for those children, too. And, any moratorium deprives those children
of their rights.
Mr. Quie: Busing of handicapped children is one-way busing; are you talking of
one-way or two-way busing?
Mr. Young: I am saying when you talk of the sanctity of the neighborhood school,
somehow that doesn't apply when you are talking of handicapped or endowed
children.
Hearings on H.R. 13915, H.R. 13982, and H.R. 15299 Before the General Subcomm. on
Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1972).
74. This observation was critical to the Vorchheimer majority's argument against the
applicability of the EEOA. See 532 F.2d at 885.
75. 20 U.S.C. § 1705 (Supp. IV 1974) (emphasis added).
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The remaining question is whether the EEOA should be applied at all in
a context seemingly far afield of the congressional objectives which pro-
duced the Act. The first maxim of statutory construction is, of course, that
the process of inquiry into legislative objectives must begin with the lan-
guage of the statute itself.76 On its face, the EEOA presents no prob-
lems of unclarity or ambiguity; rather, the problem is the complete si-
lence of the legislative history regarding a situation which appears to be
controlled by the statute's language. Under such circumstances, the most
prudent course of conduct for a court is to give effect to the plain language
of the statute, since to do otherwise would be to substitute a judge's
estimation of what Congress meant for the best evidence available, that
being the finished product of the legislature. The language and concepts
contained in the EEOA are not so esoteric or complex that it would be
imprudent to give its words their customary meaning, and the absence of
legislative history should not alter that meaning. 77 If a court is to miscon-
strue congressional intent, it would seem preferable that it err on the side of
literalism rather than on the side of judicial speculation. 78 Therefore, the
action of the Vorchheimer majority in declaring that the EEOA could not
mean what it says is both in derogation of congressional power and contrary
to principled decision-making.
CONCLUSION
Despite the current uncertainty about the application of the standard of
review in the area of sex discrimination, the maintenance of single-sex
public schools arguably constitutes a denial of equal protection. The effects
of past and present discrimination make it impossible for all-girl schools to
offer the same package of benefits, including prestige, alumnae influence
and professional contacts, that all-boy schools can offer, even when the
all-girl school possesses the same tangible attributes as the all-boy school.
Moreover, there is evidence that segregation by sex has undesirable
psychological effects on women, who may reasonably perceive their separa-
tion from the socially dominant gender as a badge of inferiority. Finally, the
cultivation of certain values and professional objectives has been a primary
function of the finer all-boy schools, and it is impossible to insure that
superior girls will be exposed to the same values of achievement-orientation
traditionally inculcated in boys, unless they have access to the same learning
environment. In short, in light of the many vestiges of sexism which remain
in American society, it is difficult for a fair-minded observer to conclude
76. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 420 (1968); 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCION § 46.01 (4th ed. 1973).
77. United States v. Dickinson, 310 U.S. 554, 562 (1940).
78. See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643,648 (1961); Exparte Collett, 337 U.S. 55,61
(1949).
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that an all-girl school can be separate but equal to an all-boy school. If the
schools are not equal, application of the Craig standard should invalidate
the discrimination.
Independent of these constitutional considerations, the Equal Educa-
tional Opportunities Act provides sufficient grounds for opening the doors
of schools like Central to girls. Although the legislative history of the EEOA
offers no guidance as to congressional objectives, the plain .language of the
statute evinces an intent to proscribe the kind of discriminatory assignment
plan employed by Philadelphia in assigning its intellectually superior stu-
dents to one of the city's two academic schools. Any attempt by a court to
divine a contrary meaning in the EEOA would be no more than an act of
"judicial legislation" deserving quick condemnation. The language of the
EEOA should be given effect by the courts; if Congress disagrees with the
judiciary's construction of the statute, it has ample opportunity to correct the
courts' error.

